

## Masterarbeit am Lehrstuhl Controlling – Februar 2024

### Topic: Optimal contracts with decentralized task assignment

Large firms are characterized by a considerable degree of autonomy at decentralized levels. Decentralized units have the authority to decide about investments, choose production quantities, and make organizational choices. Because firms' headquarters are often unable to monitor such decisions, agency theory proposes the use of incentive contracts. A difficulty in the theoretical analysis is that many models do not consider the specific form of the decentralized decisions. For instance, there may be noteworthy differences between organizational choices and choosing costly effort.

This thesis studies the optimal contract design if decentralized decision makers not only choose their effort (that is, the task intensity) but can also decide about task allocation. The optimal contract must motivate the decentralized decision makers to allocate the tasks in the firm's best interest. Based on an overview of the literature on incentive contracts and organizational choice, the thesis summarizes the theoretical analysis of Reichmann and Rohlfig-Bastian (2014) and Rohlfig-Bastian and Schöttner (2021). It provides a detailed presentation of the theoretical results including all relevant proofs and formulates practical implications for the design of incentive contracts.

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### Ausgangsliteratur

- › Reichmann, S. and A. Rohlfig-Bastian (2014). Decentralized task assignment and centralized contracting. *Journal of Management Accounting Research*, 26, pp. 33-55. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-012-0092-y>
- › Rohlfig-Bastian, A. and A. Schöttner (2021). Delegation of job design and the value of communication with imperfect performance measurement. *TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency Working Paper Series No. 47, 2021*. <https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3853904>

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### Bewerbungsprozess

Interessierte Studierende können sich bis **26.02.2024** per E-Mail bewerben. Dazu senden Sie mir bitte ein aktuelles Sammelzeugnis und ein Motivationsschreiben an [ulrich.schaefer@univie.ac.at](mailto:ulrich.schaefer@univie.ac.at). Für die Bearbeitung des Themas ist das Verständnis von einfachen Vertragsmodellen von Vorteil. Bitte legen Sie im Motivationsschreiben dar, inwiefern Sie mit vertragstheoretischen Prinzipal-Agenten-Modellen vertraut sind.

Weitere Informationen finden Sie unter

<https://controlling.univie.ac.at/master/masterarbeiten/>

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### Ass.-Prof. Dr. Ulrich Schäfer

Universität Wien

Institut für Rechnungswesen, Innovation und Strategie

Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1

1090 Wien

phone: +43 1 4277 38007

email: [ulrich.schaefer@univie.ac.at](mailto:ulrich.schaefer@univie.ac.at)